Die zentrale Rolle des Gedächtnisses in der Entwicklung von Lebewesen wurde von Biologen wie Ernst Haeckel, Ewald Hering und Jakob von Uexküll erkannt, wobei zwischen einem Artgedächtnis und einem individuellen Gedächtnis unterschieden wird. Ersteres ist für die Aufrechterhaltung und Weiterentwicklung einer artspezifischen Erscheinungsform verantwortlich, letzteres gestaltet die Erinnerung an individuelle Erfahrungen. Im vorliegenden Band werden die Vorstellungen dieser Biologen mit Ideen der Philosophen G.W.F. Hegel, Alfred N. Whitehead, John Dewey, Ernst Cassirer, Henri Bergson und Reto L. Fetz in einer kohärenten (...) Theorie der Organismen, die auch den Menschen und seine Geschichte umfasst, aufeinander abgestimmt. (shrink)

Bei der Suche nach dem Geist handelt es sich seit Jahrhunderten um ein zentrales Unterfangen in der Philosophie, das u.a. durch die folgenden Fragen charakterisiert ist: Was sind Merkmale des Geistes? Welche Arten geistiger Zustände lassen sich unterscheiden? Ist eine naturwissenschaftliche oder physikalische Erklärung des Geistes möglich? Lässt sich das Geistige auf das Physikalische reduzieren? Ist das Physikalische kausal abgeschlossen? Was heißt es eigentlich, dass etwas physikalisch ist? Wie kann der Geist Handlungen bewirken? Können wir denn so handeln, wie wir (...) wollen? Ist unser Wille frei? Welche Rolle spielen neurowissenschaftliche Ergebnisse für die Entwicklung einer guten Theorie des Geistes? Und welche Rolle spielen philosophische Gedankenexperimente? Was macht überhaupt eine gute Theorie des Geistes aus? Dieser Band, der auch an Einsteiger gerichtet ist, versammelt Beiträge zur Suche nach dem Geist von Andreas Hüttemann, Holger Lyre, Jan G. Michel, Gernot Münster, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Achim Stephan und Henrik Walter. (shrink)

A general class of labeled sequent calculi is investigated, and necessary and sufficient conditions are given for when such a calculus is sound and complete for a finite -valued logic if the labels are interpreted as sets of truth values. Furthermore, it is shown that any finite -valued logic can be given an axiomatization by such a labeled calculus using arbitrary "systems of signs," i.e., of sets of truth values, as labels. The number of labels needed is logarithmic in the (...) number of truth values, and it is shown that this bound is tight. (shrink)

The author reflects on the anthropological role of the “self-cultivation” category in the philosophical system of Immanuel Kant, for whom self-cultivation stood as the central idea of the Enlightenment. Kant believed that it was man alone who created himself to a rational being, that his rationality was not a granted good but something he had to mature to by way of multiple disciplinary, civilizing and moralizing measures. An interesting avenue in Gernot Böhme’s approach is his assumption that this conceptual (...) perspective applied to all three Kantian Critiques, e.g., that Critique of Pure Reason propounds the disciplining of human cognition under the banner of subordinating the sphere of intuition to the categories of intellect. These categories are not inborn in the human mind, but are built by the willful disciplining of the perceptual elements of cognition anchored in the animal fundaments of the humanum. Towards the close of his essay Böhme attempts a critique of Kant’s philosophy, accusing it of reductionism and depreciating many anthropological powers. (shrink)

The author asks about the conceptual tools which would enable a critique of contemporary capitalism without falling back to Utopianism and its historically-discredited theses. With the help of paired categories like community–society, human dignity–self-awareness, need–desire, Gernot Böhme portrays the deficiencies of contemporary Western social reality, e.g. the steadily exhausting reserves of the highly-bureaucratised welfare state system, the rapidly mounting differences in income, or the negative moral and psychological effects of unemployment and the so-called precariat. Böhme presents his critique of (...) “aesthetic capitalism,” which does not satisfy human needs in the Marxist sense but rather the aesthetically-refined consumer desires of today’s affluent societies, in reference to the views of contemporary critical theory authorities. (shrink)

Ordinary measurement using a standard scale, such as a ruler or a standard set of weights, has two fundamental properties. First, the results are approximate, for example, within 0.1 g. Second, the resulting indistinguishability is transitive, rather than nontransitive, as in the standard psychological comparative judgments without a scale. Qualitative axioms are given for structures having the two properties mentioned. A representation theorem is then proved in terms of upper and lower measures.

This article contains some further clarifications of the postitions held by the 'Starnberg Group', i.e. the constitution theory and the finalization theory with particular respect to the case of Classical Hydrodynamics. It is an answer to G. Eberlein und N. Dietrich who recently published a full monography dedicated to criticism of these positions.

We investigated how people interpret conditionals and how stable their interpretation is over a long series of trials. Participants were shown the colored patterns on each side of a six-sided die, and were asked how sure they were that a conditional holds of the side landing upwards when the die is randomly thrown. Participants were presented with 71 trials consisting of all combinations of binary dimensions of shape (e.g., circles and squares) and color (e.g., blue and red) painted onto the (...) sides of each die. In two experiments (N1 = 66, N2 = 65), the conditional event was the dominant interpretation, followed by conjunction, and material conditional responses were negligible. In both experiments, the percentage of participants giving a conditional event response increased from around 40% at the beginning of the task to nearly 80% at the end, with most participants shifting from a conjunction interpretation. The shift was moderated by the order of shape and color in each conditional’s antecedent and consequent: participants were more likely to shift if the antecedent referred to a color. In Experiment 2 we collected response times: conditional event interpretations took longer to process than conjunction interpretations (mean difference 500 ms). We discuss implications of our results for mental models theory and probabilistic theories of reasoning. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with representations of belief by means of nonadditive probabilities of the Dempster-Shafer (DS) type. After surveying some foundational issues and results in the D.S. theory, including Suppes's related contributions, the paper proceeds to analyze the connection of the D.S. theory with some of the work currently pursued in epistemic logic. A preliminary investigation of the modal logic of belief functions à la Shafer is made. There it is shown that the Alchourrron-Gärdenfors-Makinson (A.G.M.) logic of belief change (...) is closely related to the D.S. theory. The final section compares the critique of Bayesianism which underlies the present paper with some important objections raised by Suppes against this doctrine. -/- . (shrink)

Several authors, e.g. Patrick Suppes and I. J. Good, have recently argued that the paradox of confirmation can be resolved within the developing subjective Bayesian account of inductive reasoning. The aim of this paper is to show that the paradox can also be resolved by the rival orthodox account of hypothesis testing currently employed by most statisticians and scientists. The key to the orthodox statistical resolution is the rejection of a generalized version of Hempel's instantiation condition, namely, the condition that (...) a PQ is inductively relevant to the hypothesis $(x)(Px\supset Qx)$ even in the absence of all further information. Though their reasons differ, it turns out that Bayesian and orthodox statisticians agree that this condition lies at the heart of the paradox. (shrink)

The nature and aim of science, by E. Nagel.--Truth and provability, by L. Henkin.--Completeness, by L. Henkin.--Computability, by S. C. Kleene.--Necessary truth, by W. V. Quine.--What is a scientific theory? By P. Suppes.--Science and simplicity, by N. Goodman.--Scientific explanation, by C. G. Hempel.--Observation and interpretation, by N. R. Hanson.--Probability and confirmation, by H. Putnam.--Utility and acceptance of hypotheses, by I. Levi.--Space and time, by A. Grünbaum.--Problems of microphysics, by P. Feyerabend.--Aspects of explanation in biological theory, by M. Beckner.--Psychologism and methodological (...) individualism, by S. Morgenbesser.--Science, fact, and value, by M. Scriven.--The justification of induction, by M. Black. (shrink)

In editing Plato's Sophist for the new OCT vol. I, ed. E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, and J. C. G. Strachan , there was less chance of giving novel information about W = Vind. Supp. Gr. 7 for this dialogue than for others in the volume, since Apelt's edition of 1897 was used by Burnet in 1900 and was based on Apelt's own collation of W. The result was better than the (...) somewhat confused information printed by Burnet, even in his 1905 reprint, for W for the other dialogues in vol. I. But in the Sophist as elsewhere in vol. I collations largely due to Dr W. S. M. Nicoll added new facts about all of BDTWP and their correctors, and the search for testimonia largely carried out by Dr E. A. Duke added new facts in that area. A reviewer counts 66 changes in our text of the Sophist, which may perhaps be a slight over-estimate. Classification of changes as substantive or as falling into different groups is sometimes difficult, but I think plausible figures are as follows. We have in 25 places made a different choice of readings from the primary mss. and testimonia. We have printed conjectures where Burnet kept a ms. reading in 17 places, but conversely we have reverted to a ms. reading where Burnet had a conjecture in 8 places. We have printed alternative conjectures to conjectures adopted by Burnet in 6 places. So we have actually departed from the primary sources on at most 9 more occasions overall than Burnet. What must be noted is that Burnet had already printed conjectures on something like 87 occasions , so our percentage addition to Burnet's departures from the primary sources is modest. Moreover Burnet printed about 25 readings from testimonia; we have followed him in 20 or so of these cases, and this in turn implies that the primary mss. are in error at these further 20 places. It needs to be underlined that though Burnet undoubtedly deserved to be regarded as a safe and cautious editor, nevertheless he departed from the primary mss. on average about twice per Stephanus page in this dialogue. Sometimes, of course, testimonia showed him right to do this, but testimonia cover only a quite small part of this dialogue. Otherwise Burnet accepted almost 90 conjectures. For the Politicus the figures are fairly similar; Burnet accepted 22 Byzantine conjectures and 35–40 more modern ones. The new OCT there adds 15 or so more conjectures. (shrink)

For f: On → On let supp: = ξ: 0, and let S := {f : On → On : supp finite}. For f,g ϵ S definef ≤ g : ↔ [h one-to-one ⁁ f ≤ g)].A function ψ : S → On is called monotonic increasing, if f≤ψ and if f ≤ g implies ψ ≤ ψ. For a mapping ψ : S → On let Clψ be the least set T of ordinals which contains 0 as (...) an element and which is closed under the following rule: If f ϵ S, range ⊆ T and supp ⊆ T, then ψ ϵ T. Let φ be the enumeration function of the class {ξ: [ξ = ωn]}. Let φ be the induced Schütte-Klammerterm-function which generates the Schütte-Veblen-hierarchy of ordinals. Then φ is monotonic increasing. We show: If ψ: S → On is monotonic increasing, then otyp) ≤ min {ξ : ξ = Φ, where 1ξ = 1 if α = ξ and 1ξ = 0 if α ↔ = 0 if α ≠ ξ. For τ an ordinal let Sτ := {f ϵ S : supp ⊆ τ}. A function ψ : Sτ → On is called τ-monotonic increasing if fξ and if f ≤ g implies ψ ≤ . For a function ψ Sτ → On let Clψ ↔ τ be the least set T of ordinals, which contains 0 as an element, such that if f ϵ Sτ and range ϵ T, then ψ ϵ T. We show: if ≥2 and if ψ Sτ → On is τ-monotonic increasing, then otyp ↔ τ) ≤. We also prove a generalization of this theorem in terms of well-partial orderings. MSC: 03F15, 03E10, 06A06. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the target article “Arguments Opposing the Radicalism of Radical Constructivism” by Gernot Saalmann. First paragraph: Gernot Saalmann presents in his paper an exposition of radical constructivism that throws together such diverse thinkers as von Glasersfeld, Maturana, Varela and Luhmann. He presents their views as something of a unified front, although actually only Glasersfeld consistently represents radical constructivism. In his exhibition and critique of radical constructivism Saalmann fluctuates between ontological, epistemological and neurophysiological arguments that have (...) often little bearing on the original ideas of radical constructivism. For example, his discussion on sensory coding (§16) is hardly relevant to the basic tenets of radical constructivism. “Sensory coding” entails that there is information in the environment that can be transmitted to the organism through senses; a model denied by radical constructivism (see e.g. Glasersfeld 1995a, pp. 115–116). (shrink)

The main result of this paper were announced in Kosheleva — Kreinovich [7, 8]; for other algorithmic aspects of Hilbert's Third Problem see Kosheleva [6]. The authors are greatly thankful to Alexandr D. Alexandrov , Vladimir G. Boltianskii and Patrick Suppes for valuable discussions, and to the anonymous referee for important suggestions. This work was partially supported by an NSF grant No. CDA-9015006.

In this stimulating work of political philosophy, acclaimed philosopher G. A. Cohen sets out to rescue the egalitarian thesis that in a society in which distributive justice prevails, peopleâes material prospects are roughly equal. Arguing against the Rawlsian version of a just society, Cohen demonstrates that distributive justice does not tolerate deep inequality. In the course of providing a deep and sophisticated critique of Rawlsâes theory of justice, Cohen demonstrates that questions of distributive justice arise not only for the state (...) but also for people in their daily lives. The right rules for the macro scale of public institutions and policies also apply, with suitable adjustments, to the micro level of individual decision-making. Cohen also charges Rawlsâes constructivism with systematically conflating the concept of justice with other concepts. Within the Rawlsian architectonic, justice is not distinguished either from other values or from optimal rules of social regulation. The elimination of those conflations brings justice closer to equality. (shrink)

On the basis of the Suppes–Sneed structuralview of scientific theories, we take a freshlook at the concept of refutability,which was famously proposed by K.R. Popper in 1934 as a criterion for the demarcation of scientific theories from non-scientific ones, e.g., pseudo-scientificand metaphysical theories. By way of an introduction we argue that a clash between Popper and his critics on whether scientific theories are, in fact, refutablecan be partly explained by the fact Popper and his criticsascribed different meanings to the term (...) theoryThen we narrow our attention to one particular theory,namely quantum mechanics, in order to elucidate general matters discussed. We prove that quantum mechanics is irrefutable in a rather straightforward sense, but argue that it is refutable in a more sophisticated sense, which incorporates someobservations obtained by looking closely at the practiceof physics. We shall locate exactly where non-rigourous elements enter the evaluation of a scientific theory – thismakes us see clearly how fruitful mathematics isfor the philosophy of science. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Refusals of Treatment and Requests for DeathTom L. Beauchamp (bio)It would be hard to overestimate the importance of two decisions on physician-assisted suicide delivered recently by the Ninth and Second Circuit Courts (Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), aff’g 850 F.Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev’g 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995); Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2nd (...) Cir. 1996). They are the highest courts yet to render an opinion on this subject, and their decisions have set the stage for the U.S. Supreme Court to take one of two paths: It will either say that (1) all citizens have a liberty interest in physician-assisted suicide, or that (2) each state may set its own policy on such matters. Whichever path is elected, a right to request physician-assisted suicide is a virtual certainty, at least in some states.These opinions are later segments of an evolving legal history in which courts have held that no criminal liability exists for withholding or withdrawing a life-sustaining treatment when physicians are directed to do so by a patient or an authorized surrogate (see Alan Meisel 1992). The decriminalization of suicide and the right to refuse a life-sustaining treatment now appear to be evolving into a rule that a patient has a legal right to control his or her death, or at least to obtain a lethal prescription. We are at a delicate point in this evolving history. Neither in law nor in bioethics is the justification of physician assistance in suicide the received opinion at the present time, but support for physician assistance in dying could soon become the received opinion in both disciplines.The leading edge of the wedge producing these changes has been widespread acceptance of an extensive right to refuse treatment. This right is today axiomatic in even conservative quarters of bioethics, but 20 years ago it was far from axiomatic that all patients have a right to refuse treatment. Few at that time judged that it would be both immoral and illegal for a physician not to forgo treatment in the face of a competent, authoritative refusal of any form of medical service or treatment.The justification for assistance in bringing about death in medicine is an extension of the justification for letting patients die. Letting a patient die by accepting a valid refusal to continue in life is directly analogous to helping a patient die by accepting a valid request for help. The high value we place on [End Page 371] rights of autonomy thereby spills over from the right to refuse to the underexplored right to request active assistance. 1 As the autonomy interest in this choice increases, denial of help to the patient becomes more burdensome.Those who defend the view that euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are morally prohibited typically assume that assistance involves an act of killing, that acts of killing are impermissible, and that a defensible distinction exists between killing and letting die. However, this distinction has proved difficult to explicate, and the category of killing often seems distant from the problem at hand. For example, it is an eccentric view that a physician who prescribes a lethal medication to a patient thereby kills the patient (or, for that matter, lets the patient die) when the patient voluntarily ingests the medication and dies. So poor are the conceptual understandings of “killing” and “letting die” that conceptual confusion abounds as to which term to use in almost all morally difficult and controversial cases.A common view is that “letting die” is a matter of “ceasing useless treatments” after which patients die (Gaylin, Kass, Pellegrino, and Siegler 1988). This account is attractive, but too narrow. “Letting die” occurs in medicine under at least two circumstances: cessation of treatment because it is useless and cessation of treatment because it has been refused (which can occur even with useful treatments). Neither conceptually nor morally is “ceasing useless treatment” the proper way to state the condition under which many “letting-die” cases occur. It follows that the type of action—killing or letting... (shrink)

William Ockham and John Wyclif develop strikingly different accounts of the Eucharist in the light of strikingly different metaphysical assumptions. Ockham assumes that God can create or annihilate any other actual being without creating or destroying anything not a part of it and so that God can annihilate a substance while preserving its real accidents. Wyclif supposes that to annihilate a being is to annihilate not only its accidents but everything in its Porphyrian tree. Ockham takes being to be univocal, (...) Wyclif allows that there might be distinct ways of being. Both attempt to negotiate difficult terrain between their metaphysics and the theological orthodoxy of their time but with quite different results. While Ockham admits that consubstantiation (the co-presence of the bread and wine and the body and blood of Christ) is the most rationally defensible of the alternative accounts of the Eucharist available to him, he strives to develop an account both consistent with his metaphysics and with a plausible understanding of transubstantiation. Wyclif begins with a similar project but in the end concludes that consubstantiation is the best account of the Eucharist. (shrink)

Background Scientific and technological advancements in mapping and understanding the interrelated pathways through which biological and environmental exposures affect disease development create new possibilities for detecting disease risk factors. Early detection of such risk factors may help prevent disease onset or moderate the disease course, thereby decreasing associated disease burden, morbidity, and mortality. However, the ethical implications of screening for disease risk factors are unclear and the current literature provides a fragmented and case-by-case picture. Methods To identify key ethical considerations (...) arising from the early detection of disease risk factors, we performed a systematic scoping review. The Scopus, Embase, and Philosopher’s Index databases were searched for peer-reviewed, academic records, which were included if they were written in English or Dutch and concerned the ethics of (1) early detection of (2) disease risk factors for (3) disease caused by environmental factors or gene-environment interactions. All records were reviewed independently by at least two researchers. Results After screening 2034 titles and abstracts, and 112 full papers, 55 articles were included in the thematic synthesis of the results. We identified eight common ethical themes: (1) Reliability and uncertainty in early detection, (2) autonomy, (3) privacy, (4) beneficence and non-maleficence, (5) downstream burdens on others, (6) responsibility, (7) justice, and (8) medicalization and conceptual disruption. We identified several gaps in the literature, including a relative scarcity of research on ethical considerations associated with environmental preventive health interventions, a dearth of practical suggestions on how to address expressed concerns about overestimating health capacities, and a lack of insights into preventing undue attribution of health responsibility to individuals. Conclusions The ethical concerns arising with the early detection of risk factors are often interrelated and complex. Comprehensive ethical analyses are needed that are better embedded in normative frameworks and also assess and weigh the expected benefits of early risk factor detection. Such research is necessary for developing and implementing responsible and fair preventive health policies. (shrink)

This paper provides new elements for reconstructing Heinrich Hertz's conversion from an electrodynamic concept to a concept of field theory, a process that took place between September 1887 and February 1888. First of all, it is argued that, contrary to what one could deduce from Hertz's own presentation in his Untersuchungen (or Electric Waves), paper N∘ 5 was actually written after the first publication of papers N∘ 6 and N∘ 7; this fact is illuminated by Hertz's unpublished correspondence (Section 1). (...) Following this reordering, an approximative process of Hertz's conversion based only on his published papers is described (Section 2). Second, by complementing Hertz's published Erinnerungen (or Memoirs, Letters, Diaries) with his unpublished Versuchsprotokolle (Laboratory notes), a much finer description of this conversion process is discussed (Section 3). It is finally concluded that Hertz's idea of “air waves” belongs at the very end of this process, and was mainly attained through experimental hints found within Helmholtz's theoretical framework. (shrink)

Theoria , the international Swedish philosophy journal, was founded in 1935. Its contributors in the first 75 years include the major Swedish philosophers from this period and in addition a long list of international philosophers, including A. J. Ayer, C. D. Broad, Ernst Cassirer, Hector Neri Castañeda, Arthur C. Danto, Donald Davidson, Nelson Goodman, R. M. Hare, Carl G. Hempel, Jaakko Hintikka, Saul Kripke, Henry E. Kyburg, Keith Lehrer, Isaac Levi, David Lewis, Gerald MacCallum, Richard Montague, Otto Neurath, Arthur N. (...) Prior, W. V. Quine, Nicholas Rescher, Ernest Sosa, Robert C. Stalnaker, P. F. Strawson, Patrick Suppes, Johan van Benthem, Georg Henrik von Wright and many others. Hempel's confirmation paradoxes, Ross's deontic paradox, Montague's universal grammar and Lindström's theorem are among the contributions to philosophy that were first published in Theoria. (shrink)

In Religious Experience and the Knowledge of God, Harold Netland advances a critical-trust approach to religious experience. This approach raises important questions about what Michael Martin has called “negative religious experiences.” Netland responds by attacking Martin’s “negative principle of credulity,” but I argue that Netland’s response can be undermined if we take negative religious experiences not as experiences of God as absent, but as experiences of the world as godless. On this understanding, there is no need for a negative principle (...) of credulity; the ordinary principle still applies and puts pressure on Netland’s response. I then raise concerns with Netland’s “argument from fulfilled expectations,” even as part of a cumulative case argument. Ultimately, I propose that careful attention to the impact of Christ on our Western moral framework might help to resolve both concerns. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)